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Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions Into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions Into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

Read more on The New York Times

Contributions

  • What is equally important in cross functional communication is knowing what the other team knows, and knowing what they don't know. 346 people perished on these flights.

  • “The fatal flaws with Boeing’s 737 Max can be traced to a breakdown late in the plane’s development, when test pilots, engineers and regulators were left in the dark about a fundamental overhaul to an automated system that would ultimately play a role in two crashes.... While the original version relied

    “The fatal flaws with Boeing’s 737 Max can be traced to a breakdown late in the plane’s development, when test pilots, engineers and regulators were left in the dark about a fundamental overhaul to an automated system that would ultimately play a role in two crashes.... While the original version relied on data from at least two types of sensors, the ultimate used just one, leaving the system without a critical safeguard....

    Current and former employees at Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration who spoke with The New York Times said they had assumed the system relied on more sensors and would rarely, if ever, activate. Based on those misguided assumptions, many made critical decisions, affecting design, certification and training.

    ‘It doesn’t make any sense,’ said a former test pilot who worked on the Max. ‘I wish I had the full story.’”

  • If the New York Times article is accurate, there is definitely something that needs further investigation into the FAA says process and practices, and probably requires some regulatory oversight or better governance. The responsibility however is definitely heavier at the corporate level, and how the

    If the New York Times article is accurate, there is definitely something that needs further investigation into the FAA says process and practices, and probably requires some regulatory oversight or better governance. The responsibility however is definitely heavier at the corporate level, and how the system was designed, versus how the flight tests were conducted, not only needs to be re-evaluated but a thorough review needs to be made for bias and ethics within not only the system design but the best practices for the company and its development of technology.

  • Commercial interests overtaking everything else. Can Boeing be trusted again?

  • This is disturbing.