When Apple launched its car project in 2014, it was among a stampede of investors, executives, engineers and companies chasing the idea of a self-driving car. After Google $GOOGL began testing prototypes on public roads in California, voices across Silicon Valley insisted that autonomous vehicles would soon be commonplace. Apple didn’t want to be left behind.
At the time, the company was dealing with questions from its top engineers about its next project, according to three people familiar with the project’s origins. It had just finished the Apple Watch, and many engineers were restless to begin work on something new. Tim Cook, Apple’s chief executive, approved the project in part to prevent an exodus of engineers to Tesla $TSLA.
Apple also needed to find new ways to expand its business. The company was anticipating that sales of iPhones would slow in the coming years. Cars were part of a $2 trillion transportation industry that could help Apple, which by then was a nearly $200 billion business.
Despite having a vote of confidence from Apple’s chief executive, members of the team knew they were working against harsh realities, according to the six employees familiar with the project. If it ever came to market, an Apple car was likely to cost at least $100,000 and still generate razor-thin profit compared with smartphones and earbuds. It would also arrive years after Tesla had dominated the market.
Apple’s proficiencies are myriad, but they aren’t exactly all applicable in the world of building cars. It’s a deeply particular company, with a design-forward focus that gives its products an elevated, professional, and expensive feel — all points that would seem to work in favor of a luxury EV. Yet its supply chains, its manufacturing proficiencies, its bread-and-butter UI/UX work, none of these transfer much to the automotive world. This disconnect, it seems, led to fracturing within the project: